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Introduction
Free-market economy is about competition. Enterprises compete for mar-
ket share, investments, and customers. Winning equals profits in the free-
market game. Profitable winners squeeze the losers out of the market, leav-
ing space for more efficient enterprises to grow and develop, as well as for
new businesses that try to join the winning ranks. To make a competitive
* J.D. with Specialization in Int'l Legal Affairs 2001, Cornell Law School; B.A.,
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market operational, free-market economies need an exit system.' In free-
market countries, bankruptcy proceedings provide a uniform and effective
exit mechanism that enables the economy to function properly.
To transition to a competitive free-market economy, a country must
design a bankruptcy procedure that enables insolvent enterprises to leave
the market. In its transition efforts, post-Communism Russia faced the
challenging task of creating bankruptcy laws that were both efficient and
compatible with the nation's cultural heritage. By synthesizing features
from other countries' bankruptcy laws and utilizing the ancient method of
trial and error, Russia's legislators finally drafted and executed the Law on
Insolvency2 and the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions. 3 The after-
math of the financial crisis of August 17, 1998 that left the Russian econ-
omy in shambles tested these new laws.4 The crisis nearly obliterated
Russia's banking sector: many banks were left insolvent, and most others
had to struggle for survival.5 Fortunately, despite their imperfections, the
progressive Law on Insolvency and Law on Insolvency of Credit Institu-
tions helped the Russian banking sector to begin its recovery.
This Note examines Russia's new bankruptcy laws, the financial crisis
of August 17, 1998, and the role of the new laws in revitalizing Russia's
banking sector. Section I provides background on Russia's bankruptcy
laws and the financial crisis of August 17 and introduces the main features
of Russia's current bankruptcy legislation. Section II illustrates how the
new laws operate by describing and analyzing two exemplary bankruptcy
proceedings. These proceedings emphasize the restorative function that
the new laws perform by allowing the liquidation and restructuring of
insolvent or ailing banks. Finally, Section III considers the new laws'
imperfections and suggests improvements. These improvements would
make the new legislation a more effective weapon for fighting the aftermath
of the crisis and may help prevent future countrywide financial disasters.
I. The Birth and Formative Years of Russia's Bankruptcy Legislation
A. Development of Russia's Bankruptcy Laws
Throughout the Communist regime, Russia lacked bankruptcy legislation.6
During the period of political and economic reformation, however, the
absence of bankruptcy law threatened Russia's ability to reallocate
1. Professor Schumpeter labeled an exit system in competitive markets "creative
destruction." RICHARD V. CLEMENCE & FRANcIs S. DoODY, THE SCHUMPETEMIAN SYSTEM 63
(Augustus M. Kelley 1966) (1950). In accordance with his Pure Model, "the new firm is
established at the expense of those already in existence." Id. at 10. Thus, the creation of
new enterprises is made possible by the destruction of the old ones.
2. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva RF [Sobr. Zakonod. RF], 1998, No. 2, Item 222
(Russ.). A,
3. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 9, Item 1097.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. Svetlana Petrova, Banking: Dashed Hopes of 1999, Moscow NEws, Jan. 19, 2000,
available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com.
6. Bankruptcy Regulations in Russia, RussIA EXPPEss-PERSTROIKA: EXECUTIVE BlREFING
(Int'l Indus. Info.), Jan. 17, 1994, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library, NWLTRS File.
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resources since it was unable to reorganize insolvent enterprises effectively.
No provision of Russia's existing legislation could "ensure the highest and
best use of commercial assets following failure of a business or... permit
the surgical restructuring of a business so that its healthy components can
survive even if other aspects must be jettisoned."7 Lack of bankruptcy leg-
islation also deterred much needed foreign investment, placing an intolera-
ble burden on Russia's difficult transition to a free-market economy.8
1. Law on Insolvency of Enterprises
A Russian Presidential decree on June 14, 1992 attempted to control bank-
ruptcies.9 The decree regulated the insolvency of state-owned enterprises
but not other legal entities; "[tihis legislative act proved useless and existed
for only eight months."10 Subsequently, following a long and heated series
of debates, the Russian Parliament enacted the Law on Insolvency (Bank-
ruptcy) of Enterprises on November 19, 1992, which went into effect on
March 1, 1993.11 Also, the government established the Russian Federal
Bankruptcy Agency to prevent state-owned enterprises from going
bankrupt. 12
The legislation granted exclusive jurisdiction over insolvency cases to
the courts of arbitration, Russia's commercial court system. 13 This court
system, including trial and appellate divisions, encompasses approximately
two thousand judges throughout the Russian Federation. 14 The Supreme
Arbitration Court handles the final appeals for commercial, property, busi-
ness, and insolvency issues.15
The Law on Insolvency of Enterprises regulated corporations and
individuals.16
[It] defined the bankruptcy of a legal entity as "the inability to satisfy the
demands of its creditors for the payment of goods (work, services), includ-
ing the inability to make obligatory payments to the state and budget funds,
if the debt owed is higher than the value of its property or if the structure of
7. Scott Horton, The Death of Communism and Bankruptcy Reorganization, Am.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 1994, at 12, 12.
8. Petrova, supra note 5.
9. Bankruptcy Regulations in Russia, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. G.P. IvANov ET AL., ANnKRiZiSNOE UPRAVLENIE" OT BANKROTSTVA K FINANSOVAMU
OZDOROVLENIYU [G.P. IvANov Er AL., ANTn-CRisis GOVERNANCE: FROM BANKRUPTCY TO
FINANCIAL WELL-BEING] 6-8 (1995). The Agency was designed to represent the govern-
ment's interests in the course of bankruptcy proceedings against state-owned enter-
prises, if these proceedings were to take place. The Agency was also supposed to
monitor the financial condition of state-owned enterprises and to assist them in reorga-
nizing and regaining solvency.
13. Bankruptcy Regulations in Russia, supra note 6.
14. Sidney B. Brooks, Russia's March to a Market Economy Assisted by New Bank-
ruptcy Law, Am. BANIKR. INST. J., June 1998, at 12, 12.
15. Id.
16. Horton, supra note 7, at 12.
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the balance sheet is not satisfied." 17
A debtor could initiate bankruptcy proceedings by filing a voluntary peti-
tion with the court, or a creditor or prosecutor could initiate proceedings
through an involuntary petition. 18 The law used the so-called "balance
sheet insolvency test," a balance sheet analysis to evaluate the debtor's abil-
ity to satisfy creditors' claims. 19 A court of arbitration made the declara-
tion of bankruptcy. 20
The law provided the debtor three procedural options: reorganization,
closing, or amicable settlement.2 1 Reorganization meant an attempt to
restore the financial solvency of a business through external administra-
tion.22 The closing procedure applied where an enterprise demonstrated
no possibility for future recovery. 23 In cases of closings and failed reorga-
nizations, the court would declare the debtor bankrupt and satisfy credi-
tors' claims through the sale of the debtor's assets.
2 4
An amicable settlement referred to an agreement between the debtor
and its creditors to decrease, postpone, or discharge the debtor's obliga-
tions. 2 5 The parties could reach this settlement at any stage of the pro-
ceeding prior to a court's final declaration of bankruptcy. 26 However, the
settlement could only modify claims of creditors of the fourth rank or
below, and at least two-thirds of the involved claimants had to approve the
settlement's terms.2 7 Also, the law required the court of arbitration's
approval,28 and within two weeks of the court's approval, the debtor had to
repay at least 35% of its obligations. 29 Furthermore, the court could annul
an amicable settlement at any time for a number of reasons and resume
17. Peter A. Maximov, Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Is a Step Forward, Russ. & COM.
MONv. Bus. L. REP. (LRP Publ'ns), Apr. 22, 1998, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library,
NWLTRS File.
18. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222.
19. Sidney B. Brooks, A New Insolvency Law for Russia, Am. BANKR. INST. J., June
1995, at 36.
20. Bankruptcy Regulations in Russia, supra note 6.
21. Id.
22. Id.
Reorganisation includes external administration of a debtor's property or
financial "healing." This type of procedure is applied in cases when it is possi-
ble to restore an enterprise's solvency. In external administration, a court of
arbitration appoints an arbitration manager to be in charge of the -debtor enter-
prise. In the case of "healing", interested third persons help the debtor.
Id.
23. Id. ("If [reorganization] measures do not produce tangible results within a fixed
term, a debtor enterprise is declared bankrupt and closed down forcibly. Competitive
bidding for the company is begun and the creditors' demands are met from the resulting
funds.").
24. Id.
25. IvANov rAL., supra note 12, at 230.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 32 (describing the prioritization order
for creditors' claims).
28. Iv ov ET A.., supra note 12, at 230.
29. Id. at 231.
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bankruptcy proceedings. 30 These numerous restrictions rendered the ami-
cable settlement, in effect, a senseless option for most debtors and
creditors.
The Law on Insolvency of Enterprises also established a prioritization
system for repaying creditors.31 After the payment of expenses for the asset
sale and the enterprise's operation, the claims were to be satisfied in the
following order: (1) tort claims; (2) wages, severance pay, and royalties; (3)
secured creditor claims; (4) taxes and other government obligations; and
(5) all other claims.32 In reality, however, secured creditors were repaid
first because they received their collateral prior to the sale of assets.33
The Law on Insolvency of Enterprises constituted the first brick in the
foundation of Russia's bankruptcy system. While its main concepts were
effective, the law had numerous theoretical and practical gaps; key provi-
sions were not well conceived.34 The law failed to provide detailed defini-
tions of essential terms or lay out the procedures for implementation with
sufficient clarity.3 5 Furthermore, the mechanism for the law's operation
was not in place; judges were unprepared, and qualified external arbitra-
tion managers were lacking. 36 Because the Law on Insolvency of Enter-
prises was incomplete and difficult to implement, few bankruptcy
proceedings against minor enterprises were initiated while it was in
force.37
2. Law on Insolvency
Because of the Law on Insolvency of Enterprises' flaws, the Russian State
Duma's Committee on Property, Privatization, and Business Activities
drafted a new bankruptcy law in 1997.38 President Yeltsin signed the new
Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy) onJanuary 11, 1998, and it became effec-
30. Id. at 231-32. The court could annul an amicable settlement at any time at a
creditor's request, regardless of whether the creditor participated in the settlement. Id.
The creditor had to allege that the debtor misstated the value of its assets. Id. If the
allegation proved true, the court annulled the settlement. Id. The court could also can-
cel an amicable settlement if any party failed to comply with the settlement's terms, if
the debtor's financial condition continued to deteriorate, or if the debtor's actions while
the settlement was in force were detrimental to its creditors. Id. Any action that dimin-
ishes the debtor's assets or the debtor's future ability to repay its debts would likely be
considered detrimental by the court. Id.
31. Brooks, supra note 14, at 12.
32. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, BCD NEWs & CoMMENr (LRP
Publ'ns), Feb. 24, 1998, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library, NWLTRS File.
33. Bankruptcy Regulations in Russia, supra note 6 ("IT]he property subject to a mort-
gage is not included in the property sold in competitive bidding.").
34. For instance, the procedure for amicable settlements illustrates the problems
with the law. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
35. Brooks, supra note 19, at 37. For example, the law failed to define adequately
the secured creditors class or lay out the procedure for protecting secured claims with
respect to depreciation of collateral. Id. The law also failed to specify how a debtor
fulfills its obligations regarding notice to creditors and other due process concerns. Id.
36. Horton, supra note 7, at 12, 31.
37. IvA'ov Er AL., supra note 12, at 6, 236-50.
38. See Russian Duma Prepares New Bankruptcy Law, Russ. & CoMMomV. Bus. L. REP.
(LRP Pubrns), Mar. 26, 1997, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library, NWLTRS File.
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tive on March 1, 1998.39 The law provided dramatic improvements over
prior legislation in several respects.
First, the law replaced the "balance sheet insolvency test"40 with two
simple criteria: (1) three months must pass between the legal entity's fail-
ure to pay a debt and the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding;4 '
and (2) the debt must exceed 500 times the minimum monthly wage estab-
lished by law.42
Second, the bankruptcy procedures under the Law on Insolvency of
Enterprises-reorganization, closing, and amicable settlement-collapsed
into a unitary bankruptcy procedure for "virtually all enterprises, [for]
individual entrepreneurs, and even [for] consumer bankruptcies." 43
Third, the Law on Insolvency of Enterprises only authorized courts to
void preferential transactions-transactions that prefer one creditor over
another.44 The new law granted courts the discretion to void any of the
debtor's transactions during the bankruptcy proceeding, if the court con-
sidered the transaction detrimental to creditors.4 5
Fourth, the new bankruptcy procedure's details filled many gaps in
the Law on Insolvency of Enterprises. "'The old law had 30 or 40 sec-
tions' ..... 'The new law has about 190 different sections."' 46 Therefore,
the Law on Insolvency provided more guidance for courts and potential
bankrupts.
Fifth, the 'law deterred officers and managers from filing a voluntary
bankruptcy petition in an untimely manner.47 Their failure to promptly
file could result in "criminal penalties, personal liability for the debtor's
business debt, and disqualification from serving as a business proprietor
or manager in the future." 48
Finally, the Law on Insolvency increased the requisite qualifications
for "arbitration managers" who acted as temporary supervisors, external
managers, and receivers. 49 The law contemplated an effort to raise the
39. Maximov, supra note 17; Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed,
supra note 32.
40. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
41. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 3. This criteria measures the
debtor's ability to satisfy the claims of its creditors.
42. Id. art. 5; see also Maximov, supra note 17.
43. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32; see Sobr. Zako-
nod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 1. The only exception to the unitary procedure is
for bankruptcies of credit institutions. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art.
141; see also Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 9, Item 1097.
44. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 78; Russia's New Bankruptcy Law
Workable but Flawed, supra note 32.
45. Id. A court would likely consider any transaction that diminishes the debtor's
assets or the debtor's future ability to repay its debts following reorganization detrimen-
tal to creditors.
46. Id. (quoting Jean Brough of Baker & McKenzie in Moscow); see Sobr. Zakonod.
RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222.
47. Brooks, supra note 14, at 12-13.
48. Id.; see Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 9.
49. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 19; Maximov, supra note 17.
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managers' professionalism and efficiency.50 A court could only appoint as
an arbitration manager a private person registered as an individual entre-
preneur and specially licensed through a training course before March 1,
1999.51
The Law on Insolvency mapped out an innovative three-stage process
for most voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies: observation, external
management, and competition proceedings.5 2 During the observation
period, the court appoints a temporary supervisor.5 3 The debtor remains
in control of his business, but the temporary supervisor monitors all trans-
actions and conducts a financial analysis of the company.54 "He or she
also looks for signs of premeditated bankruptcy and fictitious bankruptcy,
which are crimes under Articles 196 and 197 of the 1997 Russian Criminal
Code."5 5 Thus, the temporary supervisor acts as both an analyst and a
law-enforcement agent.
A major responsibility of the temporary supervisor is to preserve the
bankruptcy estate until the court of arbitration makes its final insolvency
decision. The supervisor actively evaluates the debtor's transactions to
ensure that the transactions do not worsen the enterprise's financial posi-
tion.56 The temporary supervisor has the right to approve or reject the
debtor's major deals.5 7 Moreover, the supervisor may ask the court "to
void transactions by the debtor, to forbid the debtor from conducting any
transactions without his concurrence, or to order the transfer of property
of the debtor to a third party for safekeeping."58 The temporary supervisor
also may seek permission from the court "to dismiss certain individuals
from the governing body of the debtor-company if he believes that the
actions of such individuals are causing material damage to the
company."59
Another crucial task for the temporary supervisor is the identification
and notification of creditors.60 The supervisor compiles a list of creditors,
notifies them of the bankruptcy action, and organizes their first meeting.61
50. Maximov, supra note 17.
51. Id.
52. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 23.
53. Id. art. 59.
54. Id. arts. 57-58, 61-62.
55. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32.
56. Id.; Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 57-58.
57. Id. The Law on Insolvency defines major deals as involving more than 10% of
the debtor's assets or sales of the debtor's real estate. M.V. Telyukina, Osobennosti
Novogo Zakonodatel'stva o Nesostoyatel'nosti (Bankrotstve) (Special Features of the New
Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy)), ZHURNAL ZAKONOD., May 7, 1999, available at Garant,
http://-vwv.garant.ru/jorn/leg_7_05_99.html.
58. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32; see Sobr. Zako-
nod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 60.
59. Maximov, supra note 17; see Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 60.
For instance, the temporary supervisor is likely to ask the court to dismiss a manager
who steals company assets or makes highly speculative investments.
60. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32; see Sobr. Zako-
nod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 61, 63-64.
61. Id.
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"At that meeting, creditors decide whether an outside manager should be
appointed to reorganize the company, if an amicable agreement can be
reached, or if the enterprise needs to be liquidated."62 After this process,
the court takes the creditors' vote, as well as the temporary supervisor's
report, into consideration when making its final decision on the enter-
prise's fate.63
The creditors' committee elected to represent all qualified creditors
then nominates an external arbitration manager. 64 If the court appoints
the nominated manager, that manager takes full control of the enterprise
and attempts to achieve solvency.65 The external manager drafts an "exter-
nal management plan" to present at the creditor meeting.66 The creditors
can reject the manager's proposal and apply to the court for a declaration
of bankruptcy.67 But if the majority of creditors accept the plan, the exter-
nal manager assumes full control of the debtor-company. 68
During external management, the law imposes a moratorium on satis-
fying creditors' claims.69 Although the Law on Insolvency of Enterprises
included a moratorium provision, "its effectiveness was significantly
reduced by the fact that the debtor was supposed to pay fines and penalties
for nonpayment of the debt during the time of the moratorium. '70 The
Law on Insolvency prohibits fines or penalties during the period of exter-
nal management for nonpayment of debts that exceed the level set in Arti-
cle 395 of the Russian Federation Civil Code.71 All fines accumulated
before external management, however, can be collected when the external
management period ends.72
For most enterprises, external management lasts for twelve to eighteen
months. 73 If the external manager fails to restore solvency, a receiver
appointed by the court liquidates the enterprise and satisfies creditors'
claims on a pro rata basis from the proceeds of the sale.74 Alternatively,
62. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32.
63. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 67; Maximov, supra note 17.
64. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 68, 71; Maximov, supra note 17.
65. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 68-69, 72, 74; Maximov, supra
note 17.
66. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 74, 82; Maximov, supra note 17.
67. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 83; Maximov, supra note 17.
68. Id.
The external manager has the right to conclude transactions on behalf of the
debtor-company as long as no transaction exceeds 20 percent of the value of the
company's assets. If a transaction is in accordance with the external manager's
plan and is approved by the meeting of creditors, the external manager has a
right to sign off on the transaction regardless of its value.
Maximov, supra note 17.
69. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 70; Maximov, supra note 17.
70. Maximov, supra note 17.
71. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 70; Maximov, supra note 17. This
level equals the interest rate set by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
72. Id.
73. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32.
74. Id.; see Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, arts. 99, 101, 112.
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individuals may keep property that the Law on Insolvency has exempted.75
The order for satisfaction of debts remains the same as under the Law
on Insolvency of Enterprises.7 6 Secured creditors, however, can no longer
receive their collateral back, "[r]ather, they have a claim over all the assets
up to the value of their security interest, but only after tort claims and wage
arrears have been paid off."77
Overall, the Law on Insolvency is a formidable attempt to establish a
coherent, logical, and effective insolvency procedure that would facilitate
the Russian economic transition to a free market. The law is designed,
however, to be used in conjunction with more specialized bankruptcy legis-
lation covering the insolvency of credit institutions. A law outlining the
bankruptcy procedures for credit organizations finally passed in 1999,
joining the Law on Insolvency in its quest to transform Russia's economy.
3. Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions
As specified in Article 141, the Law on Insolvency only applies to credit
institutions when "the federal law on insolvency (bankruptcy) of credit
organizations" is inapplicable. 78 The law cited in Article 141 did not exist
when the Law on Insolvency took effect. In fact, the Law on Insolvency of
Credit Institutions had no analogue in earlier Russian legislation. Prior to
1999, insolvent banks were treated the same as all other bankrupt entities.
Accordingly in 1998, bank bankruptcies would have been governed by the
Law on Insolvency. The Law on Insolvency, however, specified that spe-
cialized legislation covered insolvent credit institutions, even though that
legislation did not exist in 1998.7 9
Following completion of the Law on Insolvency, the Duma began
deliberating the proposed bankruptcy law for credit institutions. The
financial crisis of August 17, 1998 rendered many Russian banks insol-
vent, making the need for the law more pressing than ever.80 Unfortu-
nately, among the Duma and top government officials, political bickering
ranked above the country's economic well-being, and, as a result, the legis-
lation was not enacted until seven months after the crisis.8 1
On January 15, 1999, the Russian Duma voted to override President
Yeltsin's veto of the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions.8 2 The Federa-
tion Council voted similarly on February 18.83 These votes obligated the
President to sign the legislation, which he did on March 1, 1999.84
75. Brooks, supra note 14, at 12-13.
76. Suprq notes 31-33 and accompanying text; see Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2,
Item 222, arts. 106-11.
77. Russia's New Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 32.
78. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, art. 141.
79. Id.
80. Supra Part I.B.
81. Yeltsin Forced to Sign Bank Insolvency Law, Russ. & COMMONW. Bus. L. REP. (LRP
Publ'ns), Mar. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library, NWLTRS File.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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The Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions is based on the Law on
Insolvency.85 It establishes similar procedures, but modifies them specifi-
cally for credit institutions. 86 For instance, while the order for satisfaction
of claims is the same as under the Law on Insolvency, account holders and
judgment creditors receive first priority.87 The law grants the Central Bank
of the Russian Federation the authority to begin and supervise bankruptcy
proceedings. 88 A bankruptcy action against a bank can only be initiated
after the Central Bank revokes the institution's banking license.89 As with
other bankruptcy cases, the courts of arbitration handle the proceedings.90
Most practitioners believe that this new law helped to restore Russia's
banking sector after the August 1998 financial crisis.91 They consider defi-
nite bank insolvency procedures and clarifications of creditors' ranking
and treatment the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions' greatest fea-
tures.92 Following the law's passage, the Central Bank developed special
qualifications for temporary bank managers. 93
The government created an Agency for Restructuring Credit Organiza-
tions (ARKO), which began operation in April 1999.9 4 The government
envisioned ARKO taking direct control of ailing and failed banks to revital-
ize them. 95 As of today, however, ARKO lacks the necessary resources to
complete its task, and a power struggle with the Central Bank continually
impairs ARKO's work.96
The Law on Insolvency of CreditInstitutions remains under review for
clarification through a series of amendments and normative acts.97 How-
85. Compare Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 2, Item 222, with Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
1999, No. 9, Item 1097.
86. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 9, Item 1097.
87. Id. art. 49; Sam Greene, Menatep Payout Preempts Bankruptcy, Russ. J., Sept. 27,
1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com.
88. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 9, Item 1097, arts. 35, 37.
89. Id. art. 36; Russia Regulations: Bankruptcy Law Comes Into Force, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., June 7, 1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://
www.securities.com.
90. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 9, Item 1097, art. 34.
91. Yeltsin Forced to Sign Bank Insolvency Law, supra note 81.
92. Compare supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text, with supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
93. Central Bank Instructions on Bankruptcy Law, B~Axns & EXcS., Mar. 15, 1999,
available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com.
94. Russia Regulations: Bankruptcy Law Comes Into Force, supra note 89.
95. Id.
96. See id. ARKO is supposed to work with the Central Bank to control the Russian
banking sector's revitalization. Id. The Central Bank, however, is unwilling to share its
power over ailing Russian banks with the government agency. See id. Thus, the Bank
often refuses to cooperate with ARKO, hindering its operation. See id.
97. 20:37 MST State Duma Approves Bill of Changes in Law on Lending Institutions
Bankruptcy, PRiME-TASS NEws WINE, Sept. 15, 1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts.,
http://www.securities.com; Amendments to the Law on Bank Insolvency, Russ. Bus. MONI-
TOR, Oct. 11, 1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com; Govern-
ment Guides Banking Legislation, INFO-NOVA PREss DIG., Oct. 29, 1999, available at ISI
Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com; Government Proposes Implementation of
Additional Indication of Crediting Organizations' Bankruptcy, Russ. Bus. MONITOR, Nov.
15, 1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com.
Vol. 34
2001 Bankruptcy Law, an Economic Medicine
ever, the government is considering no substantive changes. The current
clarifications are paramount to ensure the law's proper operation in effec-
tively combating, or perhaps preventing, a future financial crisis similar to
the August 17, 1998 crisis.
B. The Financial Crisis of August 17, 1998
The August 17, 1998 financial crisis tested the Law on Insolvency and
prompted the much needed Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions' pas-
sage. When Russia's entire financial sector, the banking sector in particu-
lar, collapsed, driving the country into recession, the country used the Law
on Insolvency to begin the restoration process. After closing the insolvent
banks, the second phase of the restoration process required the Central
Bank to initiate new proceedings against insolvent credit organizations and
required the application of the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions to
the cases in progress, such as the Bank Imperial bankruptcy.98
On August 17, 1998, the Russian government stopped paying debts
from maturing nine-month T-bills, known as GKOs (gosudarstvennye
kratkosrochnye obligatsii).99 The government had issued GKOs since
1993, constantly increasing its debt and building a so-called pyramid,
which finally collapsed on August 17.100 Russian banks bought a signifi-
cant portion of the GKOs, which were considered a relatively risk-free, liq-
uid investment. 10 1 The banks financed GKO purchases "by borrowing
from foreign banks through repo contracts, in the process exposing them-
selves to substantial currency risk."' 02
Beginning April 1, 1998, the government unsuccessfully tried to raise
enough money to meet current obligations by selling newly issued debt.
10 3
But traders knew the government's dire situation, bid low, and received
very high yields. 104 The government's efforts to keep the ruble exchange
rate stable by tightening monetary policy drove the interest rate on GKOs
beyond one hundred percent. 10 5 GKO prices fell rapidly; thus, the govern-
ment could not raise enough money and had to dip into monetary reserves
to cover daily expenses. 10 6
On August 17, the government exhausted these reserves and ceased
payments on GKOs, effectively declaring its insolvency.10 7 When the gov-
ernment abandoned all attempts to defend the exchange rate, the ruble
98. Infra Part II.
99. Gary Peach, A Year After the Crash: Pyramid Crash Began on Fool's Day, Moscow
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999, available at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Press Release, U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Eur., The Russian Crisis (Oct. 16, 1998),
available at http://www.unece.org/press/98gen12e.htm [hereinafter The Russian
Crisis].
103. Peach, supra note 99.
104. Id.
105. The Russian Crisis, supra note 102.
106. Peach, supra note 99.
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depreciated by more than twenty-five percent. l08 Given the ruble's devalu-
ation, most Russian banks that had to repay GKO-financing loans in dol-
lars became unable to meet their obligations.' 0 9 The government's
moratorium on its own debt collapsed Russia's financial system.
Numerous economic and political events that halted the Russian econ-
omy's growth culminated in the crisis. 110 Years of economic reform
deformed and weakened the Russian economic system."' Many analysts
consider the Duma deputies "guilty for August 17 more than anybody else"
because, on a yearly basis, they had been "inflating the budget and prevent-
ing expenditures from being curtailed, thus forcing the state to borrow
money." 112 Others believe that a series of top government officials' actions
in 1998 precipitated the crisis.1 13 In the words of Grigory Yavlinsky, Pro-
fessor of Economics and leader of the Yabloko Duma faction:
What [the officials] did was stop financing of non-competitive sectors of
economy ... As of early 1998 already, barter, monetary surrogates, securi-
ties, etc., accounted for 75% of the economic turnover....
The money-free system prevented collection of taxes. As a result, they
could not form the state budget properly. 1 14
The budget deficit led to extensive government borrowing, domestically
and abroad, creating the "short-term state bonds pyramid" that collapsed
on August 17, 1998.115
Russian banks also contributed to the crisis. The Central Bank failed
to warn the government about the dangers of its actions and helped the
government implement flawed economic policies. 1 6 Consequently, other
Russian banks chose not to invest depositors' money in the economy like
most Western banks.1 17 Instead, they transferred all money to accounts
abroad or invested in securities, further depleting Russia's monetary
holdings. 118
In summary, whatever its causes, the August 1998 crisis indisputably
left the Russian economy in shambles. Many Russian banks became insol-
vent in the wake of the crisis. 1 19 Fortunately, Russia's new bankruptcy
laws provided the necessary tools to begin rebuilding the economy, the
108. The Russian Crisis, supra note 102.
109. Id.
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banking sector in particular. These laws allowed the Central Bank and
creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against insolvent credit institu-
tions and ultimately close them down. Eliminating bankrupt institutions
provided the necessary room for expansion by solvent banks and for crea-
tion of new credit institutions, facilitating the vital process of creative
destruction in a market economy. 120
II. Exemplary Bankruptcy Cases
The Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions allowed the Central Bank of
Russia to mount a swift attack on ailing Russian banks. As illustrated by
the following exemplary bankruptcy proceedings under the law, the legisla-
ture should have acted sooner. Nevertheless, the Law on Insolvency of
Credit Institutions helped Russia take a tremendous step toward stabilizing
its banking sector, demonstrating that late is better than never at all.
A. Bank MENATEP
On May 18, 1999, the Central Bank of Russia filed a petition with the Mos-
cow Court of Arbitration to declare Bank MENATEP bankrupt.121 The
Central Bank's petition initiated the first bankruptcy proceeding under the
Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions that ended in a declaration 'of
bankruptcy.122 The petition followed the revocation of MENATEP's bank-
ing license on May 17, 1999 for failure to meet creditors' claims and com-
pulsory obligations.' 23
At first, the court rejected the Central Bank's petition.124 "The court
grounded the declination on the fact that presented authority of the person
[who] signed the application was inauthentic." 125 Following a series of
appeals by the Central Bank, however, the Moscow Court of Arbitration
allowed the Bank to resubmit its petition and initiated the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding against MENATEP on June 3, 1999.126 The court closed Bank
MENATEP and imposed supervision procedures, appointing Alexei Karma-
nov the provisional manager. 127 On July 14, 1999, the court instructed
Karmanov to act as a temporary head of MENATEP following its presi-
dent's removal for his non-cooperation with the bankruptcy
120. CLEMENCE & DOODY, supra note 1, at 10.
121. 13:46 MST CBR has Filed Bankruptcy Lawsuit Against Bank MENATEP with Mos-
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administration. 128
Bank MENATEP had been the fifth-largest Russian bank prior to its
insolvency in the wake of the August 1998 crisis. 12 9 The "bank reaped the
benefits of lucrative government contracts authorizing it to handle state
accounts."130 MENATEP also managed to attract major companies and
banks as creditors.13 1 Although both MENATEP's debts and assets equaled
approximately forty billion rubles when the proceedings began, the losses
from defaulted domestic loans brought its assets down to between 4.3 and
7.9 billion rubles, making it insolvent. 132 The Law on Insolvency of Credit
Institutions' passage made MENATEP's closing possible. Unfortunately,
due to the delay, by June 1999, MENATEP remained a mere shell "whose
assets had been stripped and transferred to affiliates months ago." 13 3
"Much of Menatep's business ha[d] been transferred to Menatep St. Peters-
burg, an independent 'sister' bank that continues to operate."'13 4 Moreover,
some of MENATEP's assets had been hidden abroad.13 5
Swifter legislative action enacting the Law on Insolvency of Credit
Institutions could have prevented this transfer of assets, but the Duma's
political bickering over ARKO's powers and the law's details provided
MENATEP's managers the time needed to shield assets from creditors. The
immediate supervision procedures outlined in the Law on Insolvency of
Credit Institutions' 3 6 would prevent shielding of assets.
Following the law's procedure, on July 29, 1999, the Moscow Court of
Arbitration held a hearing to determine MENATEP's fate. 137 The Central
Bank, as well as Karmanov, argued for the speedy liquidation of
MENATEP's assets, claiming that restoration of solvency was impossi-
ble.138 A MENATEP spokesman protested liquidation, presenting evidence
that the debts amounted only to 31.4 million rubles, not the 1.2 billion the
Central Bank claimed.13 9 The court chose to postpone its decision until
128. Court Removes MENATEP President, INFo-NovA PREss DIG., July 14, 1999, availa-
ble at ISI Emerging Mkts., http://www.securities.com ("The court instructed Karmanov
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economic documents, stamps, material and other valuables to the temporary
administrator.").
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September 29, 1999 at the suggestion of MENATEP's creditors.140
MENATEP's creditors voted overwhelmingly to liquidate prior to the
second hearing. 14 1 After the vote and prior to any decision on MENATEP's
fate, its shareholders used personal funds to compensate some of
MENATEP's account holders.' 4 2 Perhaps the owners were trying to
demonstrate that MENATEP cared about its account holders and deserved
a chance at recovery, or perhaps MENATEP's owners were trying to ensure
the success of future ventures by securing the trust and respect of the gen-
eral public, and possibly the court and the government. Despite the share-
holders' efforts, the court declared MENATEP bankrupt on September 29,
1999, the first institution declared bankrupt under the Law on Insolvency
of Credit Institutions. 143 The court appointed Karmanov MENATEP's
receiver and ordered liquidation.14 4
A few of MENATEP's owner-creditors, specifically Yukos and MFO
MENATEP, were and continue to be unhappy with the court's decision. 14 5
They consistently attempt to stop the liquidation and intend to reorganize,
despite the creditors committee's decision to proceed with the bankruptcy
sale.14 6 On December 16, 1999, Yukos and MFO MENATEP voiced their
readiness "to gradually repay the bank's debts to the state budget."14 7
According to analysts, this announcement sought to win state legislators'
support in the struggle to stop MENATEP's liquidation.'14
In December 1999, Yukos's spokespersons were unsure whether the
oil company planned to file a formal appeal. If Yukos files an appeal, there
is a slim chance that the appellate courts will reverse the court's deci-
sion.149 Thus, while MENATEP's ultimate fate remains uncertain, the liq-
uidation continues, demonstrating that the Law on Insolvency of Credit
Institutions provides tangible benefits by giving the Central Bank a weapon
to revive Russia's banking sector.
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B. Bank Imperial
Unlike MENATEP's bankruptcy proceedings, Bank Imperial's case started
before the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions' enactment. The court
conducted these proceedings under the Law on Insolvency until the Law
on Insolvency of Credit Institutions took effect. The switch of governing
law caused judicial confusion, illustrating a conflict between the bank-
ruptcy laws.
Two entrepreneurs, Alexander Mamut and Andrei Glorizov, founded
Bank Imperial in the early 1990s.15 0 The founders attracted some promi-
nent investors and shareholders from large fuel and energy enterprises,
including Gazprom, the Fuel and Energy Ministry, Zarubezhneft, and
LUKoil.' 5 ' This rich clientele ensured Imperial's prosperity. Imperial not
only had great investors but also a resourceful top executive, Sergei Rodio-
nov, "who had worked as deputy chairman of the Central Bank [of the
Former Soviet Union] from April through December 1991."152
Supported by the fuel and energy sector and led by Rodionov, Imperial
soon became Russia's fourteenth-largest bank.15 3 It grew by acquiring
whole subsidiaries and partial stakes in other banks.15 4 It even managed
to buy a stake in "East-West United, a Russian state bank based in Luxem-
bourg," "getting a residence permit in the center of Europe." 1
Imperial's prosperity, however, ended in 1998. "The first blow was the
partial transfer of Gazprom accounts to Gazprombank.' 1 5 6 A series of
smaller blows followed. In July 1998, when the prices of stocks and state
securities spiraled downward, Imperial's working capital dropped from one
billion rubles to six hundred million.' 5 7 Outside observers concluded that
Imperial would be unable to meet its obligations.' 5 8 On July 23, 1998,
Rodionov resigned.' 5 9 After the first week of August 1998, Imperial could
no longer meet its credit obligations. 160 On August 14, 1998, it stopped
servicing clients. 16 1 The Central Bank finally revoked Imperial's banking
license on August 25, 1998.162
On September 30, 1998, the advertising agency Cabrio, one of Impe-
rial's creditors, petitioned the Moscow Court of Arbitration to begin bank-
150. Irina Yasina, How Bank Imperial Got Its License Back, Moscow NEws, June 23,
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ruptcy proceedings.' 63 The court implemented provisional observation of
Imperial and appointed Vyacheslav Medvedev temporary supervisor.' 64
On December 3, 1998, Imperial's creditors held a meeting.' 65 The
majority of creditors voted to petition the court to declare Bank Imperial
bankrupt and order the sale of assets.166 In light of the temporary supervi-
sor's accounting, which showed that Imperial's debts greatly exceeded its
assets, the creditors decided that solvency could not be restored.' 67 The
majority of creditors also supported Medvedev's candidacy for receiver.168
At the meeting, the creditors formed a five-member committee from the
representatives of Zarubezhneft, London Forfeiting Cyprus, the Ministry of
Fuel and Energy, LUKoil, and the Central Bank.169 After the meeting,
Imperial's President, Vladimir Farasenko, urged the creditors to give the
Bank a few more months to restore solvency, claiming Imperial's license
"was recalled without the sufficient justification."' 70
In accord with the claims that its license revocation was unjustified,
Imperial appealed the Central Bank's order.' 71 On December 15, 1998,
the Moscow Court of Arbitration suspended the bankruptcy proceedings
until the court decided Imperial's appeal.172 Pending a decision on the
license revocation, the court forbade Imperial from alienating its property
and froze most of its accounts.' 73
In early April 1999, the court rejected Bank Imperial's appeal.174
Imperial "defiantly retorted that it had found 'masses' of errors in the
license's confiscation just days after the Aug[ust] 17 crisis and would
appeal to the top arbitration court.' 75 The court scheduled the hearing
on Imperial's fate for April 14, 1999.176 But Imperial "succeeded in stav-
ing off bankruptcy hearings by filing an objection ... to the judges on the
case." 177 Addressing the claim of judicial impartiality, the court appointed
new judges and postponed the hearing until May 25, 1999 to give them
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time to familiarize themselves with the case. 178 The court held the hearing
on May 25 as scheduled, despite motions by LUKoil to further postpone
the hearing because of alleged violations of bankruptcy law. The Moscow
Court of Arbitration "declared the bank Imperial bankrupt, launched
receivership procedures and appointed Vyacheslav Medvedev ...as the
bank's receiver." 179
On June 5, 1999, however, the Central Bank unexpectedly reinstated
Imperial's banking license. 180 "The decision was preceded by two events:
the appeal of the new Minister of Energy Resources Kalyzhny on the neces-
sity to return to the bank its license, and the petition of major creditors of
the bank - 'LUKOIL', 'GAZPROM' and 'ZARUBEZHNEFT' headed by the
ministry - to the Central Bank."181 The creditors expressed a desire to par-
ticipate in Imperial's recovery process, 182 but none were willing to state
what would constitute active participation.183
Given the return of Imperial's banking license, the court's decision ten
days earlier to liquidate became controversial. 184 On the one hand, the
court had applied the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions to the case.
That law specified that once a court declared a bank bankrupt, the parties
could not seek external management or amicable settlement.185 However,
the law did not address the return of the institution's license. 186 On the
other hand, Imperial's bankruptcy. commenced while the Law on Insol-
vency regulated credit institutions. Under that law, an amicable settlement
would be legitimate at any stage. 187 The court needed a solution to this
judicial quandary: "The bank was declared bankrupt while its license was
still valid." 188
Instead of resolving the issue, the Moscow Court of Arbitration simply
reaffirmed the contradiction in the law. Early in July 1999, the court over-
turned the Central Bank's decision of August 25, 1998 to revoke Imperial's
banking license. 189 Now, both administrative and judicial authorities con-
sidered Imperial's license valid. By regaining its license, Imperial set "a
178. Id.
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precedent for banks fighting to stave off bankruptcy."1 90
However, the court did nothing to resolve the controversy. Although it
ruled Imperial's license valid, the bankruptcy proceedings continued. 19 1
In fact, "police were ordered to storm bank headquarters for financial docu-
ments," which Imperial refused to turn over to Medvedev.19 2
Finally, on July 27, the Moscow Court of Arbitration reversed its posi-
tion and held invalid the Central Bank's order to return Imperial's banking
license. 193 The court revoked the license, which it had returned only three
weeks earlier. The Moscow Court of Arbitration is floundering, trying to
both interpret the new laws and please Imperial's powerful owners. Impe-
rial will likely file an appeal with the higher arbitration court; thus, Impe-
rial's ultimate fate remains uncertain.
Unlike MENATEP, Imperial continues to fight for survival. Imperial's
owners did not have the time to strip its assets because the creditors started
the proceedings earlier than those against MENATEP. Accordingly, Impe-
rial's owners have an incentive to restore solvency.
Imperial's case shows that owners will try to save their banks when
they have no opportunity to transfer assets. The drafters of the Law on
Insolvency of Credit Institutions relied on that behavior, hoping that imme-
diate supervision would protect the banks' assets and encourage the inves-
tors to save the banks to preserve their personal assets. Moreover,
Imperial's case, started under the Law on Insolvency and prosecuted under
the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions, illustrates the laws' inconsis-
tencies and the difficulty applying both laws concurrently or sequentially.
III. Imperfections of the New Laws and Suggestions for Improvement
As illustrated by these exemplary cases, the bankruptcy laws helped Russia
to begin its recovery from the financial crisis of August 17, 1998 by
empowering the Central Bank and creditors to declare insolvent banks
bankrupt. Without these laws, creditors' funds would remain frozen in
debtor banks with no possibility of repayment or debt restructuring.
Although a formidable advance over earlier legislation, the current bank-
ruptcy laws are imperfect. These laws require further improvements to
ensure that banks will be restructured or liquidated as soon as they
become insolvent. If all insolvent credit institutions dosed in a timely man-
ner, the aftermath of another financial crisis could be minimized. Perhaps,
if banks threatened by insolvency borrow and lend more carefully, Russia
can prevent a future financial crisis from ever taking place.
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A. Imperfections of the Law on Insolvency
The first problem with the Law on Insolvency is the timeframe for
appointing a temporary supervisor. Currently, the law requires the court
to appoint a temporary supervisor within three days of initiating the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 194 While this short time period would be adequate for
cases with few creditors, in cases involving thousands of creditors, such as
those against insolvent banks, a longer period would benefit the majority
of creditors.195 Under the current law, the creditor who files first, often a
powerful investor, exercises considerable influence over the choice of tem-
porary supervisor and, thus, gains control of the bankruptcy
proceedings. 19 6
The Law on Insolvency increases the probability of the first creditor's
control by granting the temporary supervisor excessive authority with
regard to recognizing claims. 197 The Law on Insolvency of Credit Institu-
tions does not correct the problem.
[Tihe temporary manager decides whether a creditor's claim is valid and
what amount of the claim will be recognized. If the creditor objects to the
temporary manager's action, he can appeal to the arbitration court. There,
he will get a 20-minute hearing .... The decision of the arbitration court is
not appealable any further.19 8
Given the temporary supervisors' broad authority to recognize claims, they
tend to abuse their power, often recognizing claims without proper docu-
mentation or rejecting legitimate claims. 19 9 A more elaborate appellate
process may ameliorate this problem, but may, in turn, clutter the arbitra-
tion courts. Professionals, legal scholars, and politicians should determine
the best solution to this problem.
Another problem left unresolved by the Law on Insolvency concerns
the temporary supervisor's ability to undo preferential transfers made in
contemplation of bankruptcy. Unlike earlier legislation, the Law on Insol-
vency includes a broad provision, article 78(3), for undoing preferential
transfers, extending back six months.20 0 This provision allows "the tempo-
rary manager or the liquidator [to] set aside transactions in which the
debtor transferred property to interested or affiliated parties or satisfied
the claims of favored creditors ahead of the claims of others."20 1 Practi-
cally, however, temporary supervisors and receivers do not use the provi-
sion, and the courts cannot supervise because they lack adequate access to
information. 20 2 Better mechanisms for court or administrative supervi-
sion could overcome this difficulty in implementation. For example,
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requiring all the debtor's documentation to be stored in a place easily
accessible to the court and the administration relieves this problem.
Commentators also criticize the law's other time limits and tax treat-
ment. For instance, the timeframe between the bankruptcy petition and
the creditors' meeting has proven insufficient to provide adequate consider-
ation for all creditor claims.2" 3 Moreover, some practitioners feel that the
law's "one-year period for completing receivership is too short."20 4 Also,
the law fails to specify whether the debtor must continue paying taxes after
declared bankrupt.20 5 However, an amendment in the near future will
likely fill this obvious gap.20 6
Finally, another problem concerns the amicable settlement procedure.
The law specifies "that no amicable agreement can be approved by the
court until documentation is presented showing that first and second pri-
ority bankruptcy claims have been settled in full."20 7 In other words, the
debtor must satisfy tort and wage claims before any restructuring agree-
ment with other creditors. In addition, the debtor cannot settle govern-
ment claims for unpaid taxes, but may need to satisfy those claims in full
after any amicable settlement, often making an agreement impractica-
ble.20 8 These features create a significant roadblock for many debtors,
preventing amicable agreements with creditors.209 Removing this obstacle
involves the elimination of mandatory satisfaction for some claims prior to
any agreement and requires permission to settle tax claims by agreement.
B. Imperfections of the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions
First, many practitioners consider the Central Bank's authority under the
Law on Insolvency of-Credit Institutions problematic. 210 The law fails to
specify dearly "where the supervisory authority of the Central Bank ends
and the primary jurisdiction of the court begins."211 As under the Law on
Banking, the Central Bank's authority continues even after it revokes an
institution's banking license.212 Practitioners believe that overlapping the
Central Bank's and the judiciary's authority creates confusion.213 They
suggest that the Central Bank's authority should end after it revokes a
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Mora. Bus. L. REP. (LRP Publ'ns), Feb. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, 2ndary Library,
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bank's license.2 14
Moreover, in supervising bankruptcy proceedings, the Central Bank
faces a profound conflict of interests. Many Russian banks are insolvent,
and the Central Bank should revoke their licenses. Decreasing the number
of operating banks, however, diminishes the Central Bank's zone of author-
ity; "if every bank goes bankrupt, the Central Bank will have nothing to
regulate."2 15 Also, the Central Bank, as a major creditor of many large
banks, may benefit from their prolonged existence. 2 16 Accordingly, the
Central Bank's authority to initiate and supervise bankruptcy proceedings
against credit organizations should be reduced or eliminated.
Furthermore, the Central Bank's authorized measures for saving ailing
banks may be insufficient. Under the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institu-
tions, the Central Bank may request that the bank's investors provide finan-
cial assistance, but cannot enforce its request. 2 17 A regulation requiring
shareholders to invest capital in the ailing bank prior to reorganization may
facilitate the restoration of banks by their own investors.
The final major criticism of the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institu-
tions concerns amicable settlements. Article 5(2) removes the parties' abil-
ity to reach amicable settlement during liquidation, an ability provided for
by the Law on Insolvency.2 18 Some practitioners consider this clause a
violation of article 421 of the Civil Code and a restriction on the freedom
of contract.2 19 In light of these potential conflicts, they urge the govern-
ment to reconsider the provision. Although the government may recon-
sider the provision, it will most likely decline to redraft the Article because
its alteration in 1999 seemed well considered and deliberate.
C. Conflicts of Laws
Conflicts among the new bankruptcy laws cause many of the problems
with these laws' operation. The Law on Insolvency, the Law on Insolvency
of Credit Institutions, and the Banking Law all regulate the insolvency of
banks.220 The following examples illustrate a few of the conflicts. First,
the Law on Insolvency lists the actions that a bank undergoing judicial
review can take during the observation period with the temporary supervi-
sor's consent.22 1 "'The Banking Law, which also applies, has a different
list of what banks can do after they have lost their license."' 22 2
214. Id. ("'Doesn't revocation of a license mean there is no bank to supervise?"'
(quoting a Moscow lawyer)).
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Second, unlike the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions, the Law
on Insolvency provides for an observation stage.22 3 In accord with the
Law on Insolvency's language, the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions
prevails. 2 24 Judicial decisions, however, suggest that judges tend to give
banks a short period of time similar to the observation stage provided by
the Law on Insolvency. To solve these conflicts between the bankruptcy
laws, the Duma should appoint a special committee to harmonize the laws
applicable to bankruptcies, in particular bankruptcies of credit
institutions.225
D. Implementation of Laws
The Law on Insolvency and the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions
are imperfect. Moreover, they often conflict with each other and other leg-
islation. Legislators can eliminate these conflicts and imperfections
through amendments and directives clarifying the laws, which should be
the product of careful study and deliberation by experts and legislators. In
addition, the laws need a better system of implementation to ensure the
proper functioning of the Russian bankruptcy system in the future. The
judges of the lower arbitration courts need more experience to understand
and interpret the bankruptcy laws. Moreover, the government needs to
train more qualified arbitration managers, and the Central Bank and other
governmental entities need to settle their power struggle for control of
bankruptcy proceedings. Resolving these practical problems will enable
the Russian bankruptcy system to function smoothly and efficiently.
Conclusion
The Law on Insolvency and the Law on Insolvency of Credit Institutions
constitute a formidable step forward in Russia's move toward a free-market
economy. These laws provide insolvent banks, as well as other enterprises
and individuals, with exit and restructuring mechanisms. By enabling cred-
itors to recover some of their debts and solvent banks to grow and ulti-
mately replace insolvent giants, the new laws pave the way for a more
efficient banking system.
The new bankruptcy laws have helped Russia to begin its recovery
from the financial crisis of August 17, 1998. This recovery, however, will
take years to complete. In mid-1999, the Central Bank estimated that over
three hundred Russian credit organizations remained insolvent without
the license withdrawal; and (4) the bank ceases payments under its current contracts,
except payments for utilities, maintenance, and under labor contracts, until a liquidation
commission is formed or an arbitration manager is appointed by the court. Sobr. Zako-
nod. RF, 1996, No. 6, Item 492. This list differs markedly from banks' permissible
actions without a license during the observation period. See supra notes 53-68 and
accompanying text.
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undergoing reorganization or liquidation.2 26 In October 1999, the Central
Bank contemplated revoking about two hundred banking licenses within
the following year.2 27 Thus, the clean-up job for the bankruptcy laws is
still in its initial stages. These laws need to be improved; but what is on
paper ought to be translated into action and implementation in order to
revitalize Russia's economy and rebuild the financial sector in the hopes of
preventing future crisis.
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